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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-1448 
_____________ 
  
MICHELLE MAMMARO 
  
v. 
  
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION  
AND PERMANENCY,  
formerly known as DIVISION OF YOUTH  
& FAMILY SERVICES;  
WATCHUNG POLICE DEPARTMENT;  
KARA P. WOOD, in her official capacity as Director of 
DCP&P; ALLISON BLAKE, in her official capacity 
 as the Commissioner of the Department of  
Children and Families;  
JOSEPH R. CINA, in his official capacity as  
Acting Chief of Police of the Watchung Police Department; 
ALIREICHEN GRAZIANI, in her individual capacity; 
BENJAMIN REHIG, in his individual capacity;  
SUAN HACKER, in her individual capacity;  
REBECCA LABARRE, in her individual capacity;  
KRISTA DEBROUX, in her individual capacity;  
OMEGA LABOATORY INC;  
ANDREW HART, in his individual capacity;  
SCOTT TALLMADGE, in his individual capacity; 
PATRICK MINNO; 
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 JOHN DOES 3-8, POLICE OFFICERS  
OF WATCHUNG POLICE DEPARTMENT, in their 
individual capacities 
  
The New Jersey Division of Child 
Protection and Permanency; 
Commissioner Allison Blake;  
Director Kara P. Wood;  
Alireichen Graziani; Benjamin Rehig; 
Rebecca LaBarre; and Krista DeBroux,  
                                                  
         Appellants  
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-06483) 
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
________________ 
 
Argued October 7, 2015 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO,  
and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  February 19, 2016) 
 
John J. Hoffman, Esquire 
    Acting Attorney General of New Jersey 
Michael C. Walters, Esquire    (Argued) 
Randall B. Weaver, Esquire 
Benjamin H. Zieman, Esquire 
Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 
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Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
25 Market Street 
Trenton, NJ   08625 
 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
Kenneth J. Rosellini, Esquire   (Argued) 
636A Van Houten Avenue 
Clifton, NJ   07013 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
________________ 
 
OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Appellee Michelle Mammaro filed this civil rights 
action claiming that the temporary removal of her child from 
her custody by the New Jersey Division of Child Protection 
and Permanency (the “Division”) was a violation of her 
substantive due process right as a parent.  On a motion to 
dismiss, the District Court held that several individual 
caseworkers were not entitled to qualified immunity.  The 
caseworkers filed this interlocutory appeal, and for the 
reasons that follow we conclude that they are immune from 
suit.  
I. 
  Because this case comes to us on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, the facts are drawn from the allegations 
contained in Mammaro’s amended complaint, which we  
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accept as true.  James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 
679 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 On July 22, 2011, Mammaro first came to the 
Division’s attention when she was taken to a hospital for 
injuries inflicted by her husband, Damon.  Although D.M., 
Mammaro’s one and a half year old child, was not harmed, 
Mammaro met with a child protective services worker from 
the Division—then known as the New Jersey Division of 
Youth and Family Services.  She agreed to send D.M. to stay 
with her brother-in-law for that night and was treated for her 
injuries and released the same day.  Damon was charged with 
several criminal offenses, including second degree aggravated 
assault, and Mammaro sought a restraining order against him.    
 At the first hearing on the restraining order, a Division 
caseworker was present and told Mammaro that someone had 
made allegations against her of child neglect based on drug 
use.  The caseworker threatened to separate Mammaro and 
D.M. unless she submitted to a drug test.  Mammaro 
complied and tested positive for marijuana.  (She admits to 
using a small amount of marijuana to calm herself after 
coming home from the hospital.)  At the final restraining 
order hearing, the caseworker appeared again and demanded 
that Mammaro take another drug test.  She again complied 
and again tested positive, with the second test showing a 
smaller level of marijuana than the first.1  Following these 
                                              
1 A hair follicle test in November 2011 showed a very small 
amount of marijuana and cocaine, but the amount found was 
too low to meet the standard for a positive test.  
  
Although Chief Judge McKee joins this opinion in its 
entirety, he notes his concern with the misleading nature of 
the Division’s brief on this point.  The brief stated that 
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Mammaro “submitted to a hair follicle drug test, which was 
positive for cocaine and marijuana.”  However, at oral 
argument, after counsel for Mammaro represented that she 
never tested positive for cocaine, the Division’s counsel (who 
was involved in drafting the brief) was given an opportunity 
to clarify whether the hair follicle test for cocaine was 
positive, as represented in the brief, or negative.  Counsel first 
responded that the result was “inconclusive,” but then 
conceded that Mammaro’s hair follicle analysis was 
“negative” for cocaine.  
 
Mammaro’s test showed 100 picograms/milligram (“pg/mg”) 
of cocaine.  The Division’s guidelines for concluding if a 
person has used cocaine requires at least 500 pg/mg.  Omega 
Laboratories requires that a test result must be “greater than 
its above listed cutoff” of 100 pg/mg.  The testing equipment 
has a margin for error of 20 percent.  Accordingly, given the 
thresholds employed by the lab and the Division’s own 
guidelines, Mammaro’s test results were negative.  
 
Chief Judge McKee believes that it is (at best) unfortunate 
and (at most) disingenuous and intentionally misleading for 
the Division to have stated, without qualification or 
explanation, that Mammaro was using cocaine.  The failure to 
explain or qualify such an assertion is particularly egregious 
here where the focus of our inquiry is the reasonableness of 
the challenged interference with Mammaro’s custody of her 
child, and the alleged bad faith of the Division.  Moreover, 
the misstatement in the brief should not be minimized merely 
because the removal of Mammaro’s child preceded the 
disputed cocaine analysis.  By its own statement, the Division 
provided the misleading lab results for “background 
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drug tests, and based on allegations from Damon and 
Mammaro’s brother-in-law that Mammaro had used drugs in 
front of D.M., the Division filed for temporary guardianship 
of D.M.  Mammaro alleges that the Division does not have a 
policy of pursuing every positive drug test as a case of child 
abuse.  
 While the petition for temporary guardianship was 
pending, the Division placed Mammaro and D.M. in a safe 
house for victims of domestic violence.  There, Mammaro’s 
interaction with D.M. was supervised by Division employees.  
Sometime later, Mammaro notified the Division that she was 
unable to get an extension to stay in the house, but it failed to 
make arrangements for Mammaro to remain there.  Without 
notifying any Division representative, Mammaro then moved 
with D.M. to a private home.  When the Division learned that 
Mammaro was no longer in supervised housing, it had police 
remove D.M. from Mammaro’s custody.  Mammaro 
challenged the removal in New Jersey Superior Court, and 
within a few days the Division returned D.M. to her and 
approved the new housing.  In June 2012, the Superior Court 
dismissed the petition for temporary guardianship and found 
that she had not abused or neglected D.M.   
 Mammaro thereafter filed a complaint in the District of 
New Jersey against numerous defendants, including the 
Division and five Division employees (the employees include 
two supervisors and three caseworkers, but for ease of 
reference we refer to them collectively as caseworkers 
                                                                                                     
information.”  Since the information was, by the Division’s 
own admission, irrelevant to its decision to interfere with 
Mammaro’s parental rights, Chief Judge McKee is concerned 
that it may have been offered in an attempt to “poison the 
[analytical] well.” 
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throughout).  In an amended complaint, Mammaro raised 
claims for violation of her rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to our 
Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.   
 The Division filed a motion to dismiss.  Although the 
District Court granted the motion in almost all other respects, 
it denied the motion with respect to one claim against the 
caseworkers: a substantive due process claim for interfering 
with Mammaro’s parental rights by temporarily removing 
D.M. from Mammaro’s custody.  The Division argued that its 
employees were protected by qualified immunity, but the 
Court rejected that defense, concluding that Mammaro had 
adequately alleged a violation and that the right at issue was 
clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct.  The 
caseworkers appeal that decision.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and the collateral order doctrine, which is an 
exception to the usual requirement of a final decision for 
appellate review.  “The requirements for collateral order 
appeal have been distilled down to three conditions: that an 
order ‘[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] 
resolve an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.’”  Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 
345, 349 (2006) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993)).  “[A] denial 
of qualified immunity that turns on an issue of law—rather 
than a factual dispute—falls within the collateral order 
doctrine.”  Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 237 (3d Cir. 2004).  
The only issue presented to us is whether the alleged violation 
of substantive due process was clearly established.  This is a 
8 
 
question of law over which our review is unrestricted.  
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2003).  
III. 
 Qualified immunity protects government officials from 
insubstantial claims in order to “shield officials from 
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their 
duties reasonably.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 
(2009).  “When properly applied, it protects ‘all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.’”  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) 
(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).  To 
overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plead facts 
“showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”  Id. at 
2080.  In our case, the Division has not challenged whether 
Mammaro sufficiently alleged a violation of substantive due 
process, and we limit our review to the question of clearly 
established law.   
 “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly 
established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, 
‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every 
‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is 
doing violates that right.’”  Id. at 2083 (quoting Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).  “In other words, there 
must be sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually 
similar to the plaintiff’s allegations, to put defendant on 
notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.”  
McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001).  
We look first for applicable Supreme Court precedent.  Even 
if none exists, it may be possible that a “robust consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority” in the Court of Appeals could 
clearly establish a right for purposes of qualified immunity.  
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Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (per curiam) 
(quoting City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 
1778 (2015)).     
 What is the right here?  The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  From the text, it is clear 
that the Clause has a procedural component, requiring the 
state to afford an adequate level of process (notice and an 
opportunity to be heard) before depriving persons of a 
protected interest.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
But the Clause also has a substantive component.  “The 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause limits what 
government may do regardless of the fairness of procedures 
that it employs, and covers government conduct in both 
legislative and executive capacities.”  Boyanowski v. Capital 
Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 In bringing a substantive due process claim, one 
alleges that the government has abused its power in an 
arbitrary manner that “shocks the conscience.”  Cty. of 
Sacremento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1998).  In this 
case Mammaro alleged the arbitrary interference with her 
right to parent her child.  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 
57, 66 (2000).  She contends that the right at issue is her right 
to be free from the temporary removal of her child unless 
there is “some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise 
to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in 
imminent danger of abuse.”  Croft v. Westmoreland Cty. 
Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997).  
This definition is too broad for purposes of qualified 
immunity, however.  We must frame clearly established law 
“in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad 
general proposition.”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 
(2001).  “The general proposition, for example, that an 
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unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth 
Amendment is of little help in determining whether the 
violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.”  
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2084.   
 We thus consider the substantive due process right of 
Mammaro as a parent in light of the specific allegations in her 
amended complaint.  She contends that the caseworkers 
removed her child after she violated the restrictions on her 
contact with D.M. by removing the child from supervised 
housing.  At the time of the removal, Mammaro alleges that 
there was insufficient evidence of past abuse or risk of future 
abuse by her to justify D.M.’s removal.  Even if so, for 
Mammaro’s case to have legs she must show that the law was 
so well established at that time a reasonable caseworker 
would have understood that temporarily removing a child in 
those circumstances would violate substantive due process.2    
 We conclude that there was no consensus of authority 
that temporarily removing a child after the parent takes the 
                                              
2 We note that the District Court’s analysis of clearly 
established law differs from what the Supreme Court requires.  
When addressing whether the caseworkers’ actions were 
clearly unconstitutional, the District Court cited only an 
unpublished decision.  Weaver v. Marling, No. 12-cv-1777, 
2013 WL 4040472 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2013) (considering 
whether three-month separation of parent and child violated 
substantive due process).  As well done as that opinion might 
be, it is not by itself an indication of a clearly established 
constitutional right.  Moreover, the opinion postdates the 
events in this case and thus could not have given fair notice to 
the caseworkers of a clearly established right.  See Brosseau 
v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 200 n.4 (2004) (per curiam). 
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child from approved housing violates substantive due process.  
Beginning with the Supreme Court, it has recognized that, as 
a general matter, “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their 
children.”  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.  From this fundamental 
right flows, for example, certain procedural due process rights 
for parents when the state seeks to deprive them permanently 
of custody.  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 
(1982); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 
(1981); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).  But the 
Court has never found a substantive due process violation 
when state agencies temporarily remove a child, whatever the 
circumstances of the removal.  Accordingly, no Supreme 
Court precedent clearly establishes that D.M.’s temporary 
removal from her mother’s custody violated substantive due 
process.   
 Likewise, assuming a consensus of persuasive 
authority could clearly establish a right, there is no consensus 
that removing D.M. was an unconstitutional interference with 
the parent-child relationship.  Mammaro’s reliance on Croft 
to argue otherwise is misplaced.  Putting aside the question of 
whether one case is sufficient to establish a “robust consensus 
of persuasive authority,” Croft is factually off point.  There a 
caseworker followed up on a “six-fold hearsay report by an 
anonymous informant” of child abuse.  Croft, 103 F.3d at 
1126.  After interviewing the father and his child, the 
caseworker uncovered no evidence of abuse, yet still 
threatened to remove the child that night.  Id. at 1124.  We 
recognized that child welfare agencies may be justified in 
removing a child when there are fears of abuse.  But before 
separating parent and child, caseworkers need “some 
reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in 
imminent danger of abuse.”  Id.  We concluded that the 
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caseworker lacked objectively reasonable evidence of abuse 
and that the separation of parent and child was an arbitrary 
abuse of government power.  Id. at 1127.     
 We have much different facts than did Croft.  
Mammaro’s husband and brother-in-law had made an 
allegation of neglect that was supplemented by two positive 
drug tests of Mammaro.  And the immediate impetus for 
D.M.’s removal was Mammaro’s decision to take D.M. from 
supervised housing, a factor not present in Croft.  While 
Mammaro does allege that the caseworkers failed to assist her 
in making new arrangements for approved housing, nothing 
in Croft suggests that the failure to assist her—however unfair 
and counterproductive it may have been—was an arbitrary 
abuse of government power that shocks the conscience.  
Accordingly, Croft did not put the caseworkers on notice that 
their conduct violated substantive due process.  
* * * * * 
 Caseworkers investigating allegations of child abuse 
often must make difficult decisions based on imperfect 
information.  Particularly when deciding whether to separate 
parent and child, a caseworker must weigh the rights of the 
parent against the rights of the child and the risk of abuse.  
We are not the first to note that the failure to act quickly and 
decisively in these situations may have devastating 
consequences for vulnerable children.  See, e.g., Arredondo v. 
Locklear, 462 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2006); Millspaugh 
v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 937 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (7th 
Cir. 1991).  This is why caseworkers are protected by 
qualified immunity unless clearly established law puts them 
on notice that their conduct is a violation of the Constitution.  
In this case, there was no such clearly established law, and 
qualified immunity covers the Division’s caseworkers.  We 
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thus reverse the decision of the District Court and remand for 
it to enter judgment in their favor.   
